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Abstract 
The current crisis in the Euro Area is mostly a serious crisis of confidence. Its solutions have 
to be systematic and consistent. Our paper discusses its main systematic reasons while keeps 
in mind the European integration and globalization issues of the world economy and 
economic financial markets. Recent problems in the Euro area are based on the diagnostic of 
the origins of the balance of payments and self-fulfilling crisis, and discussed in the context of 
suggested remedies and solutions based on diversification of the monetary policy 
management in the Euro Area to eliminate the moral hazard from its financial sector, creation 
of a functioning system of fiscal transfers and finding a compromise between centralization 
and decentralization and government interventionism and “laissez faire”. 
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1. Introduction 
The current Euro Area crisis has revealed certain flaws of the Euro Area, such as its 
vulnerability to asymmetric shocks and its inability to act as assumed by the optimum 
currency area theory (Jager and Hafner, 2013). It has highlighted the serious lack of 
confidence in the ability of the Euro Area to face challenges resulting from political and 
economic development in the Euro Area countries and in the world economy (Goméz-Puig 
and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2012). It has emphasized the influence of serious system failures of the 
global economic and political order and of serious structural failures of the "Euro project" on 
success and economic growth in the Euro Area. Consequently, it has stressed the need to find 
a systemic and consistent solution to the current problems of the Euro Area. Also Eichengreen 
(2012) supports this statement and argues that the Euro Area had been designed with some 
serious flaws, which are still underestimated. Moreover, Verdun (2012) adds that the current 
European sovereign debt crisis has put on the agenda the need to redesign the Euro Area due 
to the lack of symmetry between “economic” and “monetary” union because the main 
problem is the asymmetrical Euro Area and its mistaken institutional structure (Buti a Carnot, 
2012). 
The international financial globalization and the integration of financial markets are 
supposed to lead to a more effective distribution of resources in the global economy and to 
increase the performance of real economies. The result of related liberalization of global trade 
and foreign currency regime, inefficient regulation on world’s financial markets and the 
gradual emergence of new technologies and innovative financial instruments on these markets 
are mainly cumulating the risks in the world financial system and on the world economical 
market and their destabilization. Each country is under influence of these aspects and 
becomes more sensitive on financial turbulence and due to their high interdependence; they 
are more liable to financial spillover effects and other problems (Bekaert et al., 2006; Cubillas 
and Gonzáles, 2013; Croci Angelini et al., 2014; Eichacker, 2015). 
At the same time, in the terms of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
politically pursued and often economically unpremeditated spreading of European integration 
seems as global support of moral hazard in the financial sector. It motivates the private sector 
and governments to “consciously gamble for redemption” from their problems by making 
decisions based on morally unjustifiable and economically harmful deficit economy and 
creates conditions for the implementation of policies like “too-big-to-fail” not just on national, 
but also on international level, which supports and basically legitimizes indebtedness of 
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subjects of private and public sector including their members (Arellano et al., 2012; Bratis et 
al., 2015). 
Consequently, the result of above mentioned facts is general support and acceptance of 
debt politics in the Euro Area and their current expression is the European sovereign debt 
crisis. The crisis also results from reactions of governments and central banks of the Euro 
Area member countries on previous private debt crisis in their national economies and in the 
world economy and from different economic levels and performances of the Euro Area 
members, from unsustainable public debt of the peripheral Euro Area countries and from the 
incompleteness of the Euro project (Aizenman et al., 2013; Lothian, 2014). According to 
Baimbridge et al. (2012) the crisis is a product of fiscal indiscipline, of too expansive 
budgetary and fiscal policy and of the fact that economies in Euro Area are too competitively 
inflexible. It is thus not a crisis caused only by inability of southern European countries to 
maintain their budget expenses, but it is mainly a result of imbalances in the Euro Area and in 
the global political economy (Brancaccio, 2012). Its main causes are systemic and their core 
is in the general system failures of global economic and political order and in serious 
structural failures of the Euro Area and of Euro as the projects (Detlef, 2012; Lothian 2014). 
To ensure the proper progress of European integration and for successful fulfillment of 
its goals it is necessary to take into consideration the nature and the complexity of the causes 
of the recent crisis in the Euro Area. The crisis is in fact a serious crisis of confidence 
(Goméz-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2012) which creates a demand on systematic and 
consistent solutions to eliminate it. The aim of this paper is therefore to identify systematic 
sources of this crisis and design some of its possible solutions, or more precisely to identify 
the facts that are necessary to take into consideration when creating adequate and efficient 
solutions, while keeping in mind the European integration issue and the globalization of world 
economy. Regarding this ambition, our paper emphasizes that the crisis is the balance of 
payments crisis and self-fulfilling crisis. Considering identified issues, suggested remedies 
and solutions are based on diversification of the monetary policy management in the Euro 
Area to eliminate the moral hazard from its financial sector, creation of a functioning system 
of fiscal transfers and finding a compromise between centralization and decentralization and 
government interventionism and “laissez faire”. 
To achieve the stated objectives, the rest of this paper is organized in the following 
way: the first section clarifies basic relations of the transition of the debt crisis in the Euro 
Area from the private sector to the public sector. The second section discusses selected causes 
of the current European national debt crisis that are connected with the globalization of world 
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economy. The third section is focused on selected sources and origins of the crisis which are 
related to the question of ongoing integration in Europe and the last section summarizes 
recommendations that should be considered when proposing adequate and effective solutions. 
 
2. From the Debt Crisis of the Private Sector to the Serious National Debt Crisis 
European debt crisis is in fact continuation of the recent American mortgage crisis 
(2007) (Ureche-Rangau and Burietz, 2013) and the following global financial (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013) and economic crisis (2008) (Gennaioli et al., 
2010; Claessens a Kose, 2010; Ureche-Rangau and Burietz, 2013). As their result, 
governments of many developed countries were “forced” to introduce rescue plans and 
actions to restore confidence of investors, to avoid panic on financial markets and to prevent 
or reduce the effects of ongoing recession. Using these and other excuses, the following 
action was made: capital injections and guarantees were provided to bankrupting entities that 
were considered to be systematically important, e.g. too big to fail. However, introduction of 
the “too-big-to-fail” policy resulted in creation of huge deficits of public finances and extreme 
increase of countries national debts that have become unbearable in relatively short time. 
Problems with repayment of exploded levels of sovereign debts experienced selected Euro 
Area member countries already at the beginning of 2010 (Ureche-Rangau and Burietz, 2013). 
This fact was confirmed by several studies, i.e. by Cuestas and Steahr (2014) who analyzed 
and compared the dynamics of the national debts in the Euro Area before and after the global 
financial crisis. Significant impact of the crisis on fiscal variables in individual countries was 
also investigated (Cuestas et al., 2014). De Grauwe (2010) adds that the growth of the deficit 
in all Euro Area member countries was due to the three to the financial and credit crisis of 
2007-2009 related aspects: “1) the rescue operations of the national banking systems and the 
stabilization funds; 2) the stimulus packages to prevent a further meltdown of the type 
experienced in the Great Depression of the 1930s; and 3) the extensive tax revenue losses due 
to the meltdown of the real economy, the rise of unemployment, and decline in incomes” 
(Young and Semmler, 2011). 
It seems obvious that the governments of Euro Area countries with the help of the 
central bank and multinational institutions partially managed to “transform” the previous 
private sector debt crisis to the current public sector debt crisis in the Euro Area (Lothian, 
2014; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Grammatikos a Vermeulen, 2012). The main channels that 
enabled this transition were stock markets and the mentioned government interventions that 
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have influenced the expenses and the national debt of many Euro Area member countries 
which caused serious problems with its financing (Gennaioli et al. 2010; Ureche-Rangau 
and Burietz, 2013; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Pisani-Ferry, 2013). 
Despite the obvious negative consequences of the bailout, it is still possible to find 
supportive arguments. For example Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) are convinced that the 
government and the central bank are obliged to use all their resources to avoid loan crisis in 
the economy, and therefore they have the right to conduct any saving actions. However, they 
also warn that the interest of the government to keep the investor’s confidence in the solvency 
of the country can lead to a significant increase on its debt burden and increase the risk of 
failure when financing the debt (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Reinhart a Rogoff, 2011; Ureche-
Rangau and Burietz, 2013). Moreover, the government acts are also justified by other 
arguments, i.e. two theoretical reasons explaining the possibility of connecting two types of 
crises in the economy. The first reason is today's perception of government as the lender of 
the last resort (Kindleberger, 2005), which is responsible for maintaining the confidence on 
the financial markets in the country (Bordo and Eichengreen, 1999; Laeven and Valencia, 
2010) and the second is the effect of government bonds on the financial markets as risk-free 
assets (Ureche-Ranga and Burietz, 2013). 
An important cause of the debt crises and their movement along economy sectors, e.g. 
also the reason of the European national debt crisis is the loss of confidence of investors in the 
ability of debtors and intermediaries to fulfil their obligations and the related uncertainty in 
the financial markets (Lothian, 2014). Therefore, a government that wants to stop its increase 
has to be able to issue its debt without a rapid increase of the risk of its failure (Ureche-
Rangau and Burietz, 2013; Wehinger, 2010). 
 
3. Selected Global Causes of the European National Debt Crisis Related to the 
Globalization of the World Economy and World Financial Markets 
While taking into account the phenomenon of globalization of world economy and 
financial markets, it is possible to identify several system resources of the current European 
national debt crisis that can be classified into four groups. 
 
Deformed Monetary and Bank Systems 
The first group of causes is related to the current deformed monetary and bank systems. 
The main cause of manipulation with the economic calculations of market participants, 
significant systematic support of moral hazard and debt growth of the private and public 
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sector, prolonging and deepening of cyclical fluctuations in the economies and financial crises 
are the current centrally planned, centrally controlled and significantly deformed monetary 
and bank systems based on unsecured symbolic fiat currencies and on system of fractional 
reserve banking (Gonda, 2012; Detlef, 2012). 
These arguments can be supported by the fact that the central banks and also 
significantly involved commercial banks are nowadays live together with governments in 
some sort of financial-debt symbiosis. Central banks are also not completely independent and 
are sometimes acts even together with commercial banks to help the government to meet their 
interests. On the other hand, commercial banks are gaining significant financial resources and 
guarantees from central banks and governments that leads to a global support of irresponsible 
reliance of market participants on others to cover the losses of commercial banks and other 
entities. 
A good example of fatal conceit of the governing to design the fates of others to 
achieve their specific economic and political interests is also the change of character of 
monetary policy that happened in the Euro Area after 2008. Its result was mostly price 
deformation on the financial market and inappropriate stimulation of lending activities and 
associated debt accumulation in the Euro Area. In low interest rates environment fueled by 
excessive money supply, amount of real investments is increasing even if there is not 
adequate increase in savings and there is also no increase in demand for goods. Under such 
circumstances an increase in inflation is generally expected together with a burst of asset price 
bubbles. As a result, interest rates reduction and introduction of related nonstandard monetary 
policy actions does not seem to be a proper way of solving problems in the Euro Area. Such 
activities may result only in slowing down the market, increased inefficiency and postponing 
the solution of the crisis to the future. 
Similar effect is also achieved by bailing of indebted entities from bankruptcy, e.g. 
introduction of the „too-big-to-fail” policy that has a side effect of creating the precedent 
eligibility of bailout for all entities that are going to have similar problems in the future, 
without taking into consideration the origins of the problems (Detlef, 2012). 
 
Deformed Public Finances 
The second major group of the current Euro Area crisis sources is today's public 
finances from the aspect of globalization and financial integration. The public spending of 
many Euro Area member countries are in long term excessive and their finances are usually 
deficient. The fact of consensual acceptance of deficit guarantees to the market players high 
7 
 
reliance on the state and the tax payers of other countries. Culture of eligibility and 
dependence are built on misinterpreted application of the social justice policy which results in 
growth of public redistribution in many countries, while the development of real economies is 
being ignored (Gonda, 2012; Balcerowicz, 2014). 
The above mentioned idea is also valid the Euro Area. Many of its countries, even 
during the financial and economic crisis, have not started to reduce their spending, moreover, 
they have even continued to raise their public expenditures. It is shown on Figure 1 and we 
can see that even during the crisis years, the rate of redistribution in the selected Euro Area 
countries, except Ireland, has grown or slightly decreased. 
 
Figure 1 Level of Redistribution through Public Spending within the Euro Area 
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Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from IMF - International Financial Statistics (November 2015). 
 
Frequently mentioned cause of today's Euro Area problems is also fiscal 
irresponsibility of many its members, falsification of statistics and usage of questionable 
practices such as creative accounting (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). 
 
Deformed Moral Principles of the Society 
The third important group of system causes of the recent European national debt crisis 
arises from its global, social, economic and political background and is related with deformed 
moral principles of the society. The current global economic and political system and further 
centralization and government interventionism in the Euro Area on transnational level are 
creating economically pervert motivation for economic calculations of market players that 
strengthens their mentality of requiring and culture of relying and depending on countries. At 
the same time, they also deform the traditional society values, its moral conventions and they 
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are less applying the reciprocity of the market. For example, even Adam Smith in his work 
the “Theory of moral sentiments” (1579) emphasized the importance of strong moral habits 
for the society that, according to him, should have clear business ambitions, but should also 
respect the basic moral values. Only belief in moral principles and reciprocity ethics of the 
market can preserve the effectiveness of allocating company resources, freedom and 
prosperity (Gonda, 2012). 
 
Financial Markets, Speculations and Credit Ratings 
The fourth, and the last group of the Euro Area crisis sources originates in the 
principles and processes associated with globalization and financial integration, such as the 
architecture of financial markets, speculations of entities operating on these markets, and the 
questionable reliability of credit ratings from rating agencies that represents the essential 
pillar of activities on these markets. Securitization and speculations that are today part of 
financial markets and actually allow relocating the risks from irresponsible borrowers on 
other entities that are interested in not transparent and hazardous financial products (Cohen 
and Villemot, 2014). 
Whyte (2010) argues that the creditworthiness judgements of the third-party raters had 
attained the force of law and he warns about a huge impact of credit ratings on the cost of 
funding, regardless of whether the rated subject is a private borrower or a sovereign borrower. 
Moreover, Pagano and Volpin (2010) points out the impact of credit ratings on the 
achievements of implemented austerity measures in the Euro Area. Also, Afonso et al. 
(2011a), Afonso et al. (2011b) and Eijffinger (2012) note that credit ratings are the key part of 
the financial markets, but they conclude that rating agencies lag behind markets, that they are 
notoriously bad at predicting currency crises, that their business model is flawed, and that the 
existence of a lack of competition between three rating agencies on the financial markets is 
the reason for their too strong market position. De Haan and Amtenbrink (2011) criticize 
business model of rating agencies too and they warn about the herd behavior of investors. 
Therefore, prudential regulation and accounting standards and more competition and 
transparency are needed to increase the quality of credit ratings. 
Moreover, Wolfgang Schäuble, the German politician, argues that according to the 
recent problems in the Euro Area the financial markets do not understand the unique and 
specific construction of the euro and states: “We have a common monetary union, but we 
don’t have a common fiscal policy. We need to convince the international public and 
9 
 
international markets that this is a new form, very specific to meeting the demands of the 21st 
century” (Young and Semmler, 2011). 
The mentioned issue can be clarified by Cohen and Villemot's (2014) theory. They 
distinguish two types of debt crises: those that are the result of external shocks and those that 
were made endogenously, either as a result of self-fulfilling panic on financial markets, e.g. as 
the effect of self-fulfilling expectations of investors operating on these markets, or as a result 
of predatory behavior of “Panglossian” borrowers.  
Self-fulfilling crisis that is caused by self-fulfilling panic on financial markets happens, 
when investors expect that the government of the specific country will have a problem with 
repayment of its own debts and if they act on financial markets according to these 
expectations. It is also the same in case if their expectations are positive about the risk of 
failure with the fact that they are helping them to refinance their liabilities, and in fact they are 
supporting them in their further indebtedness (Arellano et al., 2012). In such a situation, the 
most important role is objectivity and truth of information that determine expectations of 
investors, and thus the reliability of countries by the credit rating they receive from rating 
agencies.  
Key factor that influences the formation of such type of debt crisis is by Arellano et al. 
(2012) also represented by the current level of debt of the government. As a result, 
government is obliged to optimize its indebtedness policy in order to avoid its exposure to an 
excessive risk of failure. 
The formation of the self-fulfilling debt crisis that is caused by predatory behavior of 
“Panglossian” borrowers, who are characterized by Krugman (1998) as borrowers who focus 
only on their best prospects for growth and success, while they consciously expect their own 
failure while paying their own debts. Arellano et al. (2012) blames countries that are in 
recession, but have motivation to lower their government expenditures very slowly, or even 
raise them and at the same time, raise their public debt. Such entities would consciously 
“hazard with their survival”, in the belief of recovery of their economy relying on increased 
tax incomes and economic growth. In case of persistence of their problems, they would 
become vulnerable to the sort a self-fulfilling crisis of their national debt and they would be 
exposed to the risk of a bankruptcy. 
An essential factor, that motivates governments to hazard about their survival, is the 
development of expenditures on their indebtedness. It also depends on the activities of the 
particular government. For example Arellano et al. (2012) has marked the anti-crisis policies 
and actions of EU and MMF, as explicitly harmful and supporting indebtedness of other 
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members. In fact any policy, that increases the countries bond prices (reducing the income 
from them) or reduces the cost of its failure, motivates to gamble for redemption and helps to 
increase its indebtedness. It is necessary to emphasize the influence of the “Euroilusion” that 
arose after the creation and introduction of Euro, on the expenses of the GIIPS countries (De 
Grauwe and Yueimei, 2013). As a result, the governments tend to employ deficit spending 
policies even if they are going to have even more debts, e.g. it is worth for them to gamble for 
survivor. Therefore, in the context of the Euro Area issues, it is appropriate to evaluate the 
fiscal discipline rules that are laid down in the Pact of Stability and Growth in the Fiscal 
compact (Eijffinger, 2012). The key role in the Euro Area's crisis is represented not only by 
those four universal systematic global causes of debt crises, but mostly by the specific system 
failures of the  project. 
 
4. Selected European Integration Related Causes of the European National Debt Crisis 
European national debt crisis was caused mostly by specific systematic failures of the 
Euro Area and euro projects, e.g. causes related to the European integration issue, while for 
simplification purpose we can again divide this issue into four groups. 
 
Questionable Goals of European Integration 
The first group of the causes is related to the goals of the current progress in the 
European integration. Based on Winston Churchill's words from 1946, basically the aim of 
integration in Europe is supposed to preserve the peace on European soil and to ensure 
freedom, prosperity and wealth of its inhabitants (European commission, 2015). These 
objectives are also defined by Article 3 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
European union and the Treaty about the functioning of EU. More specifically, the primary 
EU’s goal is to preserve peace in Europe, its values and the wealth of its nations on this 
continent, and puts much less stress on the economic aspects, such as ensuring the economic 
growth, price stability, full employment, strengthening the competitiveness of its members 
and so on (ECB, 2011). Therefore, the Union’s principle cannot be described as primarily 
economic, but rather political. It is also confirmed by later progress of European integration, 
which has been significantly influenced with geopolitical reasons. 
Also Cesarano (2013) writes about the dominance of the political objective of 
European monetary unification and as well as Hall (2012) adds that the Euro Area was in fact 
a large political project, initiated by French President François Mitterrand and supported by 
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German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the line with "une certaine idée de l'Europe" in order to 
bind a newly unified Germany to Europe. Hall (2012) additionally stresses the conditionality 
of inception of the Euro Area and euro on French agreement to German unification and on 
creation of the Stability and Growth Pact. He also gives two important aspects of the new 
economic doctrines which were deciding in the case of the "Euro project": Firstly, he argues 
that mainstream economics moved away from the  Keynesian view that fiscal policy is crucial 
tool for stabilizing the economy, towards the monetarist view that fiscal policy is not 
stabilizing tool for the economy and that monetary policy has few lasting effects on the real 
economy, and states that the implication of this opinion in the context of European integration 
was that fiscal policy should remain roughly neutral and diversified and that monetary policy 
should be rule-based, targeted on inflation and unified. At the same time, the disputable limits 
placed on debt and deficits of the Stability and Growth Pact were found as adequate. It turned 
out to be questionable (Hall, 2012; Weeks, 2014). Secondly, he argues that in keeping with 
the opinion that demand management is essentially irrelevant to economic growth, the new 
economic doctrines held that economic growth depends largely on structural reform to the 
supply side of the economy targeting the more intensive competition in markets for goods and 
production factors, concrete for labor and capital, and states that the implication in this case 
was that all the Euro Area member countries should use the same approach and the same 
formula to protect economic growth. According to his opinion, the problem was the belief of 
responsible persons that competition under the new stringent conditions imposed by a single 
market and by a common currency but without any better fiscal integration or coordination 
would force suitable structural reform on the Euro Area member states and lead to gradual 
institutional convergence in their political economies (Hall 2012). 
Therefore, the principle of the European integration cannot be described as primarily 
economic, but rather as definitely political. It is also confirmed by later progress of European 
integration, which has been significantly influenced with geopolitical reasons and whose 
economic aspects have been largely marginalized or taken in to account only very 
superficially. Namely Klaus (2004) argued that the largest and the most important part of the 
positive economic impact of the European integration on its members has come only through 
the liberalization of trade and investment and has been already obtained. The cause of this is 
according to him the fact that the role of the exchange rate risk as a factor determining the 
cost of capital and the cost of foreign investment is really relatively small and therefore trade 
is not important to have the same currency on both sides of the realized transaction (Klaus, 
2004; Jager and Hafner, 2013). 
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On the other side, some economists argue that the euro project have an important 
economic objective, thus that it “was conceived as a way of completing the single market” 
(Grant, 2013). He and McNelis (2013) point out that the euro was not only a political project 
but he also admits that the economic expectations related to this project were mistaken. They 
state that the euro was a project with the goal to enhance political cohesion in Europe which 
begun with the creation of the Common Market in 1957. McNelis (2013) also emphasizes that 
an important economic argument for the inception of monetary union in Europe “is enhanced 
price competition, since goods and services would be priced in a single currency, which in 
turn would lead to greater transparency about relative costs across borders, thus increasing the 
efficiency of making financial decisions” (McNelis, 2013). He argues that all of this, the 
countries hoped, would pave the way toward greater convergence in economic growth and 
economic performance across the Euro Area. However he also states that the introduction of 
the euro was connected with waiver of countries’ independent monetary policies and of option 
of currency devaluation to regain their competitiveness, relative to other countries. Thus the 
assumption that a common currency would generate economic convergence and political 
unity was unfortunately misleading and had a contrary effect (Baimbridge et al., 2012). A 
good example is the divergence between peripheral Eurozone countries and Germany. The 
GIIPS countries have extraordinarily high unemployment rates and their ratios of debt to 
gross domestic product are at least unpleasant (McNelis, 2013). 
In order to prevent that any country or group of European countries gains a strategic 
advantage in weapon production with the intention to create a common market for that 
particular commodity, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community has 
been signed as first step on the way towards free and prosperous Europe. With the ambition to 
ensure the control of nuclear energy in Europe, in 1957 the European Atomic Energy 
Community has been formed and in order to strengthen the economic cooperation between the 
signatory countries, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community was signed 
within the same year with objective to ensure economic and social progress of participating 
countries, the constant improvement of living and working condition for the people living in 
those countries, to ensure and strengthen piece and liberty in Europe by implementing 
common actions when removing barriers that divide it. 
While the objective of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
was supposed to create a common European market, according to the Single European act that 
has been signed in 1986, the common European market should be created. The positive aspect 
of the ongoing integration has been, for example upholding the principle of four freedoms - 
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free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, but its serious negative aspect has been 
the strengthening of aggressive European political integration that leads towards the creation 
of European economic and political union (European commission, 2015). 
An important milestone of the primarily politically motivated European unification has 
been the signing of the Treaty on European Union in 1992 that included an agreement of the 
signatory countries about establishing a single common currency - the Euro. Although this 
step has been justified by politicians and political scientists as a necessary step for the proper 
functioning of the single market in the Euro Area, in fact it has been more a political than an 
economic decision. It is confirmed by the divergence in opinions of economists about the 
possible positive impact of this decision on the social, economic, structural and institutional 
group of heterogeneous countries, as the Euro Area undoubtedly is. Also the economists had 
concerns about the establishment of conditions of the common currency, later also about the 
rules for countries joining the new Euro Area and about the constantly changing and 
increasingly riskier conditions for its members. As a result, the closer integration and 
harmonization in the Euro Area has been pursued, but in fact there were few exceptions when 
approving acts in the Union, depending on the situation and individual interests of particular 
countries. 
An important sign of the dominance of political objectives of European integration 
was also ignoring the opinion and the willingness of the citizens of member countries to form 
the proposed monetary union, respectively to enter such monetary union with strongly 
heterogeneous members and acknowledging rational reasons against its creation. Recent 
crises and problems that Euro Area challenges in the last years, they support the belief that the 
unity and solidarity of its members require the conduction of a variety of common economic 
policy actions to preserve stronger mutual economic convergence among member countries. 
This is also confirmed by many studies that are emphasizing significant economic disparities 
in the Euro Area, classifying its countries to several significantly different groups (Artis and 
Zhang; 2002; Nechio, 2011; Holinski et al., 2012; Monford et al., 2013) and claiming that the 
economic divergence of the Euro Area member countries is significant, and it’s not 
decreasing over time. 
 
The Design of the Euro Area 
The second relevant group of the sources of current Euro Area crisis is, taking into 
account the aspect of European Integration, a group of causes related to the issue of the Euro 
Area design according to the Optimum Currency Area Theory. As stated in the previous part 
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of this chapter, a basic and really important asymmetry was built into the Euro Area from its 
inception (Hall, 2012). Although Ishiyama (1975, p. 378) concluded his review with the 
following obituary: “the theory of optimum currency areas is primarily a stochastic discussion 
which contributes little to practical problems of exchange rate policy and monetary reform” 
(Tavlas, 2009). Thus also use of the OCA theory related arguments can be disputable as well. 
In general, the Euro Area is namely what is well known as a currency area. A number 
of independent nations share a common currency, have a common monetary authority and a 
common monetary policy and also have debts denominated in the common currency but still 
have their own independent fiscal policies for government spending and taxation. Thus, the 
countries do not have political accountability to the currency union about how they tax and 
spend. And this is the reason why they run up their debts. Therefore just “this combination of 
complete monetary union with little or no fiscal coordination or accountability is the Achilles` 
heel of the euro zone” (McNelis, 2013). In the case of Euro Area is also the problem the 
common monetary authority, that have in the monetary union a function of a lender of last 
resort to banks but which have in the individual Euro Area member states only a limited 
supervisory authority over other banks, thus its activities in the area are relatively limited. It 
means, while the ECB has the responsibility to be a lender of last resort to the banks in the 
euro zone, each country has its own banking supervision laws and its own national accounting 
practices and standards. Also the too late reaction of the ECB to the debt problems in the Euro 
Area was criticized. Therefore it is easy to state that the introduction of the euro was probably 
premature for many actual Euro Area countries and that the Euro Area is obviously not an 
optimum currency area, or a region for which it is optimal to have its own currency and its 
own monetary policy, while the optimality is defined in terms of the attainment of both 
internal balance and external balance (Tavlas 2009; McNelis, 2013). 
Also the analysis of the ability of the Euro Area to fulfil the criteria of the Optimum 
Currency Area theory for creation of an optimum currency area requires highlighting various 
discrepancies (Jager and Hafner, 2013). Mundell together with McKinnon and with Kenen 
recognized that forming a monetary union requires giving up the ability to realize an 
independent monetary policy and the ability to adjust the exchange rate of a national currency. 
They stressed that separate currencies among economies increased the transactions costs and 
information costs of money, and resulted in relatively thin foreign exchange markets, raising 
both the volatility of prices in those markets and the ability of speculators to influence prices. 
To help guide the decision whether a country should join a monetary union, those authors 
namely proposed criteria that could help alleviate the loss of an independent monetary policy 
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and the exchange rate tool among countries participating in a monetary union Mundell (1961). 
emphasizes the importance of the factor mobility, which can help take the place of exchange-
rate adjustments, especially he made it clear that it can be the labor mobility as well as the 
capital mobility. Also Eichengreen (1997) explored the importance of the capital mobility in 
the short run. Their idea was that, where such mobility exists, adjustments to shocks can be 
spread out over a longer time period than otherwise. McKinnon (1963) put the accent on the 
openness of the economy. Kenen (1967) considered fiscal integration as a key criterion. He 
also argued that economies with either similar, but narrow, production structures or with 
diversified production structures are suited to form a monetary union. Mussa et al. (2000) 
pointed out that the quantity of reserves should be a factor guiding the choice of exchange-
rate regimes (Tavlas 2009). Thus, while Eichengreen (1991) and Krugman (1998) highlight 
the increase in regional specialization and the reduction in income correlation under a 
common currency, Frankel and Rose (1998) point out greater trade integration leading to 
more correlated business cycles, results that speak against and for optimality respectively 
(Cesarano, 2013). 
It is therefore clear that the set of criteria of suitability for membership in a currency 
union includes two groups of criteria. The first group consists of criteria that reduce the 
exposure of member states to asymmetric shocks. This group includes similarity of economic 
structure, intraregional trade and a really low degree of specialization. The second group 
contains criteria that facilitate the adjustment of the member states to asymmetric shocks and 
includes homogeneity of preferences of the member states, factor mobility and good 
functioning system of transfer payments. It is also important to add that the authors of the 
OCA theory defines an asymmetric macroeconomic shocks as a shocks “if only one part of 
the currency union is hit by the shock while the other part is spared or if member countries 
differ widely in terms of the shock`s impact on their economies” (Jager a Hafner, 2013). 
Krugman (1979) defines a balance of payments crisis as the government's inability to 
defend fixed parities due to the limitation of its power and according to the authors of the 
Optimum Currency Area Theory (OCA Theory: Fleming, 1971; Kenen, 1967; McKinnon, 
1963; Mundell, 1961), the money is an economic instrument which has, in the case of an 
independent state with its own currency, a key role in the absorption of economic imbalances 
(such as loss of competitiveness, or unemployment). Thus, when a countries decide to 
abandon its currency and to join a monetary union, they deprive themselves of an important 
instruments used to smooth out the internal and external imbalances emerging in the currency 
union (Guerreiro, 2014; De Grauwe and Yueimei, 2013; Calice et al., 2013). 
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As such, the proponents of OCA theory are talking about the existence of certain 
"trade-off" between the homogeneity of countries belonging to a monetary union and the 
existence of real adjustment mechanisms that would operate in the currency union. A very 
close similarity of the union members should, in fact, prevent from the occurrence of 
asymmetric shocks caused by imbalances in the union, and the presence of functional 
adjustment mechanisms should preserve that the currency union and its members will recover 
from these asymmetric shocks in the case that their homogeneity is not sufficient. As a result, 
a monetary union in which none of the above mentioned conditions are present is considered 
(by the creators of the OCA theory) to be a suboptimal monetary area. In such a case, fixed 
exchange rate, representing the rule “one-size-fits-all” accompanied by the single monetary 
policy is by no means an adequate regime for preserving its current internal and external 
balance. In such a monetary union, a non-compliance of PPP can happen among its members, 
which in turn leads to external imbalances. Persistence of such imbalances can easily turn into 
the crisis of balance of payments and, finally, even a sovereign debt crisis (Guerreiro, 2014; 
Cuestas and Steahr, 2013). 
 
Figure 2 Current Account Imbalances within the Euro Area  
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Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from IMF - International Financial Statistics (November 2015). 
 
Non-optimality of the Euro Area is also confirmed by Manolopoulos (2011), saying 
that the design of the Euro Area differs significantly from the design of optimum currency 
area, which was based on criteria of OCA theory. The above mentioned scenario describing 
the origin of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area is further supported by Figure 2 (large 
current account imbalances) and Figure 3 (significant accumulation of sovereign debts). 
Countries with a higher and faster growing public debt are also experiencing large current 
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account deficits (Gros, 2012; Sklias et al., 2014). Due to low labor force mobility, lack of 
fiscal transfers, artificial suppression of the German unit labor costs, politics, inflationary 
policy that serves mainly the countries with surpluses, and low level of diversification of the 
economies of its members, we must consider the idea of introduction of a single currency by 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as relatively irrational decision (Detlef, 2012; Persson, 2011). 
Therefore also Jager and Hafner point out that euro area is „a combination of rapid capital 
migration and limited labor migration” rather than an economically well-integrated currency 
union (Jager and Hafner, 2013). 
 
Figure 3 Government Debt in the Euro Area 
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Bonatti and Fracasso (2013) state that since the establishment of the Euro Area, intra-
European current account imbalances have grown significantly. It reflects diverging trends in 
competitiveness between core countries and periphery countries of the Euro Area. 
Introduction of the single currency and the single monetary policy significantly contributed to 
this divergent trend. Similarly, Cesaratto (2015) insists that the Euro Area sovereign debt 
crisis is a balance of payments crisis, tied to current account deficits and capital outflows 
(Lavoie, 2015). De Grauwe (2013) supports this opinion and he argues that the absence of a 
sovereign central bank caused a liquidity crisis followed by a solvency crisis in the Euro Area. 
He states that Euro Area member states had to issue debt in a new currency that is not under 
their control (De Grauwe, 2013; Caseratto, 2015). 
Additionally, Weeks (2014) argues that when the global financial and economic crisis 
struck the continent in 2008, the trade-based deficits of the periphery countries of the Euro 
Area proved unsustainable. “With the exception of Greece, neither public debts nor fiscal 
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deficits represented a major problem among Euro Area countries prior to 2008” (Weeks, 
2014). However, for example Brancaccio (2012) states that internal imbalances in the Euro 
Area are an integral part of a monetary union attributable to the greater degree of financial 
integration between the Euro Area member countries and thus it depends only on by the 
individual country followed theoretical approach to the issue how to secure economic growth. 
However, Lavoie (2015) argues that although the continuous loss of foreign reserves 
must lead to some adjustment, Euro Area member countries can never run out of TARGET 2 
balances, because TARGET 2 balance can take unlimited negative values. Therefore, the 
evolution of the balance of payments cannot be considered as the source of the current crisis 
in the Euro Area. He sets a parallel between Keynes’s proposal of an International Clearing 
Union and TARGET 2, but he states that TARGET 2 is less constraining than Keynes’s Plan 
because TARGET 2 has no limits as to the size of advances that can be taken by national 
central banks from the ECB, which acts in the Euro Area as the international clearing agency 
(Lavoie 2015; Caseratto, 2015). He recognizes the main cause of the European sovereign debt 
crisis in the long-run absence of a credible lender of last resort in the Euro Area, which 
explains the speculative attacks against the securities issued by the governments of the Euro 
Area periphery countries. Therefore, he and Frenkel (2012) see true causes of the crisis on the 
side of investors, in the set up and self-imposed constraints of the ECB and in the imperfect 
institutional design of the Euro Area. 
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012) emphasize that the root of the current European 
sovereign debt crisis lies in the external imbalances between its core and periphery countries 
and they claim that these imbalances occur as a reaction on optimistic expectations about 
income convergence generated in the Euro Area and as a reaction on an investment boom in 
the Euro Area periphery, which was accompanied by ballooning current account deficits 
financed by private capital inflows (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013). According to Bonatti and 
Fracasso (2013) and Chen et al. (2013) the situation turned sour only when Greece was 
fingered and when ECB and other international organizations decided to embark on the fiscal 
consolidation. 
Grahl (2011) therefore recommends the Euro Area to create an adjustment mechanism 
to smooth out the imbalances arising between the surplus and deficit members. Sklias et al. 
(2014) criticizes the absence of European mechanism for fiscal transfers. Eichengreen (1991) 
has the same opinion and proposes a system of budgetary transfers in the form of injections of 
liquidity between the individual countries of the Euro Area, a creation of suitable system of 
redistributing policies and central fiscal authority (Dibooglu a Horváth, 1997). Varoufakis 
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(2012) assumes that this necessary type of “recycling” of budget surpluses can have either the 
form of standard money transfers between countries or the form of transnational investments 
in production in countries and regions with a deficit (Sklias et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2013). 
Also Jager and Hafner (2013) point out that in the case of asymmetric shock, a transfer 
payments system is a valuable feature in a currency union that helps to effectively re-establish 
economic equilibrium. 
In general, the current European sovereign debt crisis sparked a debate about creation 
of a fiscal union in Europe. Mac Dougall et al. (1977) and De Grauwe (2009) state that public 
finance in existing economic union plays a major role in eliminating short term fluctuations 
and cyclical fluctuations. They say that there is no such mechanism in the Euro Area and that 
this is an important reason why in present circumstances monetary union in Europe is 
impracticable (Bargain et al., 2013). Many economists similarly warn that the Euro Area is 
too heterogeneous and thus far from being an optimum currency area. Therefore, the Euro 
Area will be fragile and vulnerable to economic shocks unless complemented by more fiscal 
and political integration. Schuknecht et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of fiscal 
discipline and proposing an independent fiscal council for the Euro Area with the aim of 
improving governance and compliance. 
Fuest and Peichl (2012) suggest some possible elements of a European fiscal union, 
namely: fiscal rules for the Euro Area member states, a crisis resolution mechanism, a joint 
guarantee for government debt, a mechanism of fiscal transfers between Euro Area countries, 
and an extended European budget and European taxes. Bargain et al. (2013) studied effects of 
a European tax and transfer system and of a fiscal equalization mechanism on the income 
distribution and automatic stabilizers in the Euro Area. He finds that replacing one third of the 
national tax-benefit systems with a new European system would lead to significant 
redistributive effects both within and across Euro Area countries. Introducing a fiscal 
equalization mechanism would redistribute revenues from high to low income countries, but 
according his opinion the stabilization properties of this mechanism are ambiguous. He also 
argues that strengthening of fiscal discipline alone is not sufficient. 
The main argument in favor of deeper fiscal integration in Europe is also that it might 
improve macroeconomic stability in the Euro Area, increase the transparency and improve 
democratic control of EU policies. However, fiscal integration raises various concerns and the 
political enforceability of such integration is disputable. Although some economists argue that 
the unprecedented divorce between the main monetary and fiscal authorities offers advantages 
in limiting political influence on monetary policy, the current European sovereign debt crisis 
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has renewed doubts about the wisdom of this approach (Goodhart, 1998, Beetsma and 
Bovenberg, 1998; Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010). 
The European sovereign debt crisis is therefore a balance of payments crisis, which 
arose and became persistent due to the presence of large external imbalances of members of 
the Euro Area in relation to their main partners in the Euro Area. It is also necessary to draw 
attention to the unique position of Germany in the Euro Area as a leading export nation and 
therefore not only to propose the requirement of an effective system of fiscal transfers in the 
Euro Area, but also the need to set certain limits on its internal trade that would prevent the 
emergence and development of a “fatal addiction” among its members similar to that between 
China and the USA. An increasing number of economists considers German neomercantilist 
policies as one of the main causes of the current European sovereign debt crisis (Sinn, 2007; 
Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013; Kaindl, 2013; Caseratto, 2015). 
And because the growth strategy of German economy included an “agreement with 
trade unions for real wage restraint, reduction of labor protection to allow for reduced wages 
at the low end of a segmented labor market” (Constant and Massey, 2003), and de facto large 
export subsidies through tax incentives linked to exports, Germany is seen as the main 
beneficiary of the euro as well as the main reason of the problems of the Euro Area. Germany 
was criticized regarding to its entry the Eurozone at an uncompetitive exchange rate and 
regarding to its wage moderation that was equal to a real devaluation against other members 
in the Euro Area (Young and Semmler, 2011). Also Jager and Hafner (2013) confirmed that 
competitiveness of Germany has increased since the introduction of the euro (Jager and 
Hafner, 2013; Baimbridge et al., 2012). 
Therefore, Germany now needs to reconsider its position and its steps because “the 
only way for other Euro Area countries to lower fiscal deficits without their economies 
collapsing is through a huge net export expansion, based upon both improved productivity 
and crucially buoyant external demand” (Baimbridge et al., 2012). 
The amount of newly created euros and for some Euro Area countries the interest rate 
which was maintained too low by the ECB, have radically reduced the cost of loans for 
private sector entities in the peripheral Euro Area countries. In these peripheral countries a 
formation of bubbles started appearing (i.e. the real mortgage markets in Spain and Ireland or 
the public sector in Greece) (Stein, 2011; Baimbridge et al., 2012; Soares et al., 2014). Thanks 
to the support from the government, the euro-illusion of homogeneous Europe, despite its 
negative consequences, was still growing. There has been a deepening economic recession 
and moral hazard on the part of ECB and Euro Area governments, which under the temptation 
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of the low cost borrowing and the newly established guarantee of rescue in case of 
difficulties, decided to “gamble for redemption” from the problems associated with external 
influences and their irresponsible deficit management (Stein, 2011). 
It can be said that that Euro and the membership in the Euro Area are generally 
increasing the risk of endogenously caused, self-fulfilling crisis, both when talking about 
crises caused by self-fulfilling  panic in the financial markets, as well as in those of the crisis 
which are caused by reckless behavior of “Panglossian” borrowers (Cohen and Villemot, 
2014). Therefore, considering that the basic determinant of the self-fulfilling crisis is the 
starting level of public debt of an individual country, it is necessary to reassess the adequacy 
of existing rules of fiscal discipline in the Euro Area. 
 
The Euro-Illusion and Economic Myths of Euro Area 
The third relevant group of the systematic causes behind the current European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, considering a clarification of the main aspects of the European 
integration, is represented by a group of sources related to the euro-illusion and economical 
myths of the Euro Area. “The euro has been promoted on the basis of spreading of myths and 
illusions which fail to respect economic principles, which postulated a prerequisite for a 
common market, competition and economic integration in Europe that are the one and only 
(the administratively established - fiat) currency and harmonized conditions” (Gonda, 2012). 
The general preconditions for a trouble-free and efficient functioning of the market, however, 
are unrestricted competition supported by diversity and the absence of core barriers to the free 
exchange (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). 
At the same time, the arguments that strict compliance of the Maastricht criteria and 
the fiscal rules in their current form, without a working and automatically acting sanctioning 
mechanism, will preserve trouble-free functioning of the monetary union with heterogeneous 
members, which the Euro Area undoubtedly is, are very optimistic. The formerly listed rules 
are, in fact, mainly administrative measures. For many countries, the above mentioned 
compliance can prove to be inappropriate and even harmful. They are often perceived as a 
strong stranglehold of their economic growth, as a factor which deepens the disparity between 
economies and as a reason for their deterioration. Also De Grauwe (1995) states that the 
criteria are not based on arguments of economic theory but they result from political economy 
of monetary union in Europe. For example, in 1994, only Luxembourg satisfied these 
conditions and many of current Euro Area member states do not satisfy some of these 
conditions now. As a result, there is a great likelihood that these convergence requirements 
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will have the effect of keeping the monetary union small. Already De Grauwe (1995) warns 
that the Maastricht criteria will be ineffective. Moreover, they have no root in the OCA 
theory. The relevance of the criteria consists, according his opinion, only in two elements. 
One has to do with the hegemonic position of Germany in the Euro Area, the other with the 
possible inflation bias of the monetary union caused by inflation development in Germany in 
the time introducing of the euro. 
Marelli and Signorelli (2010) have highlighted the complexities between nominal 
convergence and real convergence of the Euro Area countries. The OCA theory also indicates 
the existence of functional chain between these forms of economic convergence and 
emphasizes the task that real convergence plays in creating an effective monetary union, 
which would be able to yield pure growing benefits out of its existence. On the other hand, 
many authors are pointing out that the benefits of a nominal convergence manifest themselves 
rather macroeconomically unstable economies at later stages. They argue that balancing the 
disparities in the structural conditions of the Euro Area member countries, the growth of their 
economic openness and the effects of fortifying the integration of international trade within 
the Euro Area require many years, if not decades. De Grauwe and Yueimei (2013) point out 
the possible short-term negative effect on the economic growth of the Euro Area member 
countries when enforcing adherence to the criteria of nominal convergence. Efforts to 
maintain the criteria of nominal convergence and fiscal discipline rules often lead to the 
enforcement of restrictive economic policies, and thus to introducing measures that slow 
down economic efficiency and performance and support economic divergence among 
member countries. 
 
Figure 4 Long-term Government Bond Yields in the Euro Area (10 years maturity) 
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Opinions on the criteria of nominal convergence and the rules of fiscal discipline 
pushed in the Euro Area are generally quite divergent. Buiter (2004) underestimates the role 
of an inflation criterion, criteria of progress in long-term interest rates and criteria of the 
exchange rate control, and only highlights the criteria for fiscal sustainability. On the other 
hand, De Grauwe and Schnabi (2005) who emphasize the conflict between nominal and real 
convergence, emphasize just the requirement for stability of exchange rates. 
A single currency also means one central bank for all Euro Area countries, with one 
interest rate regardless of the economic level and national competitiveness of the country. A 
system of unspoken guarantee was formed, promising the weaker members to be rescued by 
the stronger, and a dangerous illusion of prosperity in Euro Area was created (Gibson et al., 
2012). While before entering the Euro Area countries paid a premium corresponding to the 
state of their economies for the money borrowed on the financial markets, the introduction of 
euro has reconciled the development and the level of interest rates on government loans. 
Thus, as shown in Figure 4, since the idea of a common currency was adopted, interest rates 
of the peripheral economies have stabilized and moved to the level of interest rates the core 
countries (i.e. Germany and France) (Gajewski, 2014). 
 
Euro Economic and Euro-Political Factors 
The fourth and last relevant group of the causes behind the current European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis is represented by a group of sources associated with the euro-political 
factors. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis has highlighted the fact that having a single 
currency and a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy prolongs and deepens the economic cycles 
and supports the growth of debt in the Euro Area member countries. At the same time it 
confirmed, that a single monetary policy conducted in the Euro Area wasn’t equally desirable 
for all of its members. It was only apparently convenient for the core countries, while being 
too expansive and harmful for the peripheral countries (Lothian, 2014; Panico, 2010; Crowley 
and Lee, 2009). Initially the ECB adopted a low interest rate policy in 2002-2003. The policy 
stimulated financial speculation. However, after 2005 it changed strategy so that interest rates 
climbed until the autumn 2008 crash. Its goal was to curb “external inflation” despite an 
already tight monetary environment (Baimbridge et al., 2012). 
Huge capital inflows had an identically negative impact on the debt in the Euro Area, 
as reported by all stressed countries during the period leading to the crisis. These capital 
inflows reflected the belief of the investors to the “Euro Illusion”. These large capital inflows 
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were accompanied by a substantial reduction in long-term bonds, a large increase in the 
growth rate of money and credit supply, the relatively sharp increase in price levels and a 
deterioration of competitiveness. All these factors demotivated governments of the Euro Area 
members to implement reforms to comply with the budgetary constraints to which they are 
committed (Dellas and Tavlas, 2012; Lothian, 2014). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Euro is essentially a political project with an unprecedented character. Namely the 
adoption of a common fiat money, common monetary authority and common monetary policy 
by a large number of independent and heterogeneous countries (insufficient progress in 
cyclical and structural convergence), but still without any better fiscal integration or 
coordination, attracts great attention worldwide, particularly with regard to its long-term 
prospects (Hall, 2012; Baimbridge et al., 2012). It is questionable, what is the optimum 
number of countries participating in the common European currency so that the Euro Area 
can be considered as the optimum currency area and what are the necessary integration forms 
for effective functioning of this currency area. Especially the political integration issue is an 
important subject of a further discussion. This admits also Bordo (2004), which states that 
monetary union without political union proved to be short-lived (Bordo 2004). The prevalence 
of the one-money-one-country pattern is namely a striking regularity, something like a general 
natural law, which clashes with the implications of the Optimum Currency Area Theory 
(Cesarano, 2013). Consistent with this opinion is also the current Eurozone crisis considered 
as a result of a large failure of political will, because the proximate cause of declining 
confidence in the bond markets lay in increases in public or private sector debt that might 
have been avoided if governments had taken steps to limit it. Additionally, some economists 
claim that the crisis might have been prevented by more assertive structural reforms focused 
on competition in markets for goods and production factors. They also stress the importance 
of coordination of strategies for preserving a sustainability of economic growth in the Euro 
Area and the fact that degree of financial integration is unequal in several countries using the 
euro (Cesarano, 2013; Ferreira et al., 2016). Eichengreen et al (2014) also emphasizes the 
crucial roles of the real exchange rate, of the external environment, i.e. of external shocks, and 
of the debt restructuring. 
Thus, by taking the role of financial market agents and rating agencies into account, 
the current Euro Area crisis is mainly the crisis of confidence. Moreover, the euro turned out 
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to be a heavy burden for some periphery countries when the monetary union was hit by an 
asymmetric shock, i.e. by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Jager and Hafner, 2013). Also 
governing institutions of the Euro Area, the ECB and the European Commission, are 
generally seen as no subject to democratic accountability, let alone control (Baimbridge et al., 
2012). Therefore, the solutions of the crisis have to be systemic and consistent. However, the 
results of previous actions indicate a lack of efficiency, do not solve its nature, but even 
worsen it, and move it into the future. They also have created a precedent of certain eligibility 
for salvation for all entities that fall into similar problems with the fulfilment of their debt 
obligations in the future, irrespective of the causes of these problems (Detlef, 2012). Forms of 
assistance to indebted countries and austerity measures underlying this aid depend namely on 
the sentiment in the financial market without a sufficient economic base (De Grauwe and 
Yueimei, 2013). 
Considering that during the current crisis the Euro Area members cannot adjust 
interest rates or exchange rates to stabilize their economies, they have to find an another 
solution. One of the possible solutions is moral suasion and to castigating debtor countries for 
their lack of responsibility and for their profligacy. However, the effect of this solution is 
disputable, it has only short duration and it is not rational (Chick and Pettifor, 2011). More 
generally it indicates that implementation of austerity policies across the Euro Area has been 
asymmetric. Hence, if the euro is to prove permanent, it requires a firmly based equilibrating 
mechanism. 
Relying on the OCA theory, according to which the euro area is clearly a sub-optimal 
currency area, and on views of Keynes, one can consider a working mechanism of fiscal 
transfers as an appropriate adjustment tool for smoothening out the imbalances between 
surplus and deficit Euro Area member countries (Sklias et al., 2014). However, 
implementation of such mechanism in the Euro Area requires establishment of a fiscal union 
and, despite the fact that centralization and regulation are one of the main problems of the 
Euro Area, a further strengthening of the political integration. A common European tax 
system, which would be complementary to existing national tax systems and a common 
European budget, is necessary (Baimbridge et al., 2012). 
One of the possible ways of solving the current European debt crisis is to create some 
sort of the United States of Europe, i.e. a European (federal) state; similar to what Winston 
Churchill declares in his discourse in 1946. However, the basis for correct functioning of this 
state should be a suitable compromise between government interventionism and leases faire 
approach of government to the economy of the country. Keynes insists on the unavoidability 
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of the government affecting the economy because of the uncertainty that is formed when 
relying on the free hand of the market. However, experience shows that excessive 
centralization and excessive government intervention in the economy only lead to the growth 
of costs and inefficiency. When handling this compromise, it is necessary to consider that 
alongside the government, the market is another factor capable of manipulating economic 
agents and influencing their decisions (Sklias et al., 2014). 
When creating an adequate system of fiscal transfers in the Euro Area, again according 
to views of Keynes, it is necessary to ensure an expansionary effect of this mechanism in the 
years of economic recession and crisis. However it should be based on the rationalization of 
government expenditures. The fiscal transfers in the Euro Area on the supranational level 
would be able to mitigate the volatility of investments of the Euro Area in the turbulent years 
(Kuhn, 2014). 
Considering fiscal centralization, it’s appropriate to propose a common European tax 
system, which would be complementary to national tax systems. Major European investment 
projects should be founded. They would be realized in the peripheral Euro Area countries and 
would lead to more efficient use of resources in the Euro Area and would be an essential 
mechanism for preserving converging development of the Euro Area member countries. It is 
also important to implement sanctions for trade within the Euro Area, especially for countries 
with large surpluses on their current account, such as Germany. The funds that would flow 
from them could be part of a system of fiscal transfers in the Euro Area and could be invested 
in the development of deficient regions (Cesarano, 2013). 
Establishment of a European super-state is obviously a last resort and not a very 
realistic solution. “It ignores constraints imposed by current political reality. It also intensifies 
long-held fears about the diminution of national sovereignty involved in closer integration, 
whereby such an attack upon the independence of nation-states camouflages the fact that the 
single currency project was inadequately conceived, ignoring many of the tenants of OCA 
theory in favor of a preference for a political “fix”” (Baimbridge et al., 2012). Thus, this 
strategy is at least politically impassable and would cause massive waves of nationalism and 
resistance against the idea that the disciplined countries would have to pay for the mistakes 
and irresponsibility of the less disciplined countries. Likewise, British Prime Minister David 
Cameron commented on the idea of closer political integration: “For us, the European Union 
is a means to an end - prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within 
Europe and beyond her shores - not an end in itself” (Kuhn, 2014). 
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Of course, there are several other alternatives how to solve the Euro Area crisis, such 
as the managed or unmanaged breakdown of the Euro Area. For example Baimbridge et al. 
(2012), in this context suggests that “Germany could leave the single currency, taking Austria, 
Finland and the Netherlands (if they so desire) with it to form a German-mark area. Exiting 
from a position of strength would generate less panic, reducing the threat of bank runs and 
contagion. Many legal and technical challenges would remain, but the reputation of the 
Bundesbank would permit time to erect the required institutions and controls. The remaining 
euro countries would secure immediate gains from the devaluation of the slimmed-down 
currency, following a debt restructuring aimed at controlling private and public sector debt 
whilst promoting the demand required for economic growth. The demise of the currently 
constituted Euro Area would impose fewer costs than the status quo or alternative scenarios” 
(Brancaccio, 2012). 
Controlled collapse of the Euro Area, however, it is unlikely alternative because in 
such a case, the European leaders would have to admit their failure and the failure of the euro 
project. However, this solution would be possible and real if the political prominent members 
of the Euro Area would be opened to compromises. Voluntary withdrawal of individual 
countries from the Euro Area would create a precedent and a wave of mass exodus from the 
Euro Area countries (Gonda, 2014). In such a case the proposal of a multi-speed monetary 
union could be the solution, in which the new members, or markedly underdeveloped 
countries of Euro Area would be inserted into a different regime of monetary policy. This 
measure would allow them to reduce the gap with other, more efficient and developed 
members of the union and sufficiently adapt to the conditions of a single currency. However, 
a crucial problem of this solution is the absence of sufficient data to indicate where this 
process of disintegration or fragmentation of the Euro Area might end (McNelis, 2013). 
Although Klaus (2004) is convinced that such a way from the problems of the Euro Area is 
real and he states: “My own experience with the termination of the Czechoslovak monetary 
union in February 1993 suggests that it can be done without serious costs, smoothly and 
efficiently” (Klaus, 2004). 
“Current account imbalances among Euro Area members and the resulting 
accumulation of external private and public credit and debt appear to be further causes of 
instability. The gap between unit labor costs seems to be one of the determinants of trade 
imbalances. More specifically, Germany, despite its current account surplus, has adopted a 
policy of relative wage deflation in recent years that has increased this gap” (Brancaccio, 
2012). According to him the possible paths are adjustment of effective demand and of unit 
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labor costs in the Euro Area, i.e. introduction of an “European wage standard”. It “may 
prompt countries with surpluses to generate higher growth in nominal wages, prices, and 
wage shares, thus helping to restore the balance in trade and safeguard European unity. This 
means that any asymmetric shocks would be absorbed through the flexibility of wages” 
(Brancaccio, 2012). Additionally, the adoption of adequate expansionary economic policies 
by countries with surpluses, and of the EU as a whole is necessary. 
However, changes in the Euro Area regardless of the implementation of any concepts 
of solving its problems should necessarily include appropriate reforms and structural policies. 
These should be focused on employment and the labor market, to promote flexibility in wages 
and prices, to minimize bureaucracy and regulatory burden on businesses and the elimination 
of patents that are a significant drawback to progress and innovation in the Euro Area. Despite 
the shortcomings of the Euro Area and the euro projects, it is necessary to make an effort to 
sustain a common currency. Only the united Europe is competitive enough to its competitors 
on world markets, e.g. China and the USA. However, the question about the optimum design 
of the common currency union consisting of the European nations remains unanswered. 
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